Spillover effects, from one country or region to other countries and regions, have attracted renewed attention in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of December 1994. This paper uses data on closedend country funds to study how a negative shock in Mexican equities is transmitted to Asia and Latin America, and to particular countries within each region. Country funds allow us to study the transmission to other fund net asset values (NAVs) and prices, which are traded in local stock markets and in New York, respectively. The evidence indicates that shocks such as the Mexican crisis produce spillover effects which are less strong in Asia than in Latin America. The shocks seem to affect Latin American NAVs directly, while transmission to Asian NAVs appears to "pass through" the New York investor fund community, rather than directly from equity prices in Latin America to equity prices in Asia. Even though the data show that co-movements are stronger within each regional market --East Asia, Latin America, and New York--than between them, investors do treat different countries differently. Shocks such as the Mexican 1994 crisis seem to have a stronger impact in countries with weak fundamentals. A high debt/export ratio makes the Philippines vulnerable, for example, despite its location in East Asia, while a low debt/export ratio makes Chile relative less vulnerable, despite its location in South America.
Introduction
Among the debates that gained -or regained-interest after the Mexican crisis of December 1994 has been one concerning "contagion." Although contagion effects have been much discussed, relatively little research has studied this phenomenon directly. In the present paper we study spillover effects using data on closed-end country funds. We look at contagion from Mexico City to the international investor community in New York City, and from there to various local markets in Asia and Latin America. We study spillover effects not only between regions but also within them.
Country funds provide a useful tool to study contagion or spillover effects, since two values are available for each fund. Country funds trade in New York City at their price, while their underlying assets trade in the equity markets of each respective country at their net asset value (NAV).
1 Even though the country fund is a different way of holding the underlying assets, each fund price is not equal to its NAV. In consequence, we are able to compare the investor demand for basically the same asset in two different parts of the world. We are able to look separately at how changes in Mexican asset prices affect other country fund prices and NAVs.
One of the present authors used the message of the country fund prices in 1994, to warn about the possibility of a coming repeat of the international debt crisis of 1982, originating again in Latin America. We take the liberty of quoting at length:
An interesting possible hypothesis regarding recent capital inflows is that foreign residents are more optimistic about domestic assets than are domestic residents. A widely-held interpretation of the massive capital flight from Latin America that took place in 1982 and the years immediately preceding it is that residents of these countries correctly perceived dangers ahead, at a time when foreign banks were foolish enough to be still lending eagerly....Nevertheless, anyone who is concerned about a possible replay of 1982 --as are Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993a,b) --wants to be vigilant to any future signs that the locals are again losing confidence.
Unfortunately, capital flight can only be estimated with a lag of a quarter or two (and, even then, very imperfectly) .
Another place where it might be useful to look are the prices of country-funds that In Frankel and Schmukler (1996) , we study how the three Mexican funds each turned from discounts to premia at the time of the December 1994 Mexican devaluation. We interpret this change as an indication of Mexican investors reacting first to the Mexican devaluation, given that they seemed to have better information about Mexico. In this paper, we extend that work, by looking at how the Mexican crisis had spillover effects over other markets. In particular, we study how markets in Latin America and Asia were hit by the crisis. In addition, country funds allow us to see the reaction of the New York community of investors that buy emerging market securities. This may shed light on the nature of international contagion.
Among the questions that we are able to address in this paper are the following. The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the contagion literature that appeared after the Mexican crisis, and distinguishes between different types of contagion. It also presents some known facts about country funds, summarizing the findings of Schmukler (1996), and Schmukler (1996) . Section III displays some descriptive statistics, documenting the correlation across countries that everyone has observed. Section IV, the heart of the paper, contains
Granger-causality tests of contagion. It first focuses on how country fund prices and net asset values are linked. Then, it studies through what channel a change in Mexican equities affects fund prices 4 and NAVs in other regions, using a different methodology from previous contagion papers. Section V explores different patterns in different countries. We relate the magnitude of spillovers to balanceof-payments fundamentals.
Contagion of Different Types a) Previous Contagion Studies
The Mexican crisis of December 1994 has generated some concerns that are specific to this crisis, and other issues that had been raised previously, but are now being re-examined in light of the new evidence. Among them, the issue of contagion, in this episode dubbed the "tequila effect," has particularly regained attention.
A subset of the contagion papers approach the issue as part of more comprehensive models. Burki and Edwards (1995) and the IMF (1995) describe how different countries, particularly those in Latin America and Asia, were hit after the Mexican collapse. Goldfajn and Valdés (1995) provide theoretical support on how shocks are propagated to other countries, focusing on the role of financial intermediation. Calvo and Reinhart (1995) address the issue directly by looking at weekly returns on equities and Brady bonds, for Asian and Latin American emerging markets. They find evidence of higher comovement after the Mexican crisis than before. They also find differential regional patterns, suggesting regional rather than global contagion. Valdés (1996) On the one hand, high cross-country correlation coefficients may be due to similar fundamentals or to common external shocks -as one would expect in a very wide variety of models.
We can call these high correlations "fundamentals contagion. " Bordo, Mizrach and Schwartz (1995) , for example, find high correlation among stock prices in emerging markets (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , and yet are able to attribute most of it to fundamentals (either a correlation of in-country fundamentals, or a sharing of external fundamentals). They describe such contagion as "pseudo systemic risk."
At the other extreme, we would also find high cross-country correlations if self-fulfilling expectations make investors leave all emerging markets when a shock hits one of them. Some use 6 the term to refer to simultaneous speculative attacks or bubble-burstings that are unrelated to fundamentals. We can call this type of contagion "herding behavior contagion," or "true contagion."
An example of herding behavior modeling can be found in Calvo (1995) . He shows that the tequila effect can be explained in a context of costly information and diversification opportunities.
When investors have a set of investment alternatives they have less incentive to obtain costly information regarding individual countries. Investment in each particular country becomes more sensitive when investment opportunities increase. Investors are able to switch to other countries when they receive bad news about one nation. Therefore diversification leads to more ignorance and herding behavior on the part of international investors.
This tendency has been remarked upon in the past. It was said that Colombia suffered from a loss in banker confidence in the 1982 crisis along with the rest of Latin America, even though it had followed better policies than the other debtors. More recently, it has been said that many unlikely countries attracted capital inflows in 1991-93 because they were identified in investors' minds with other borrowers that had undertaken more serious reforms (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993) .
In between the two extreme types of contagion lie some institutional explanations for the correlation. For example, a fund that invests in Latin America markets or in all emerging markets may be led by capital losses on its Mexico holdings to sell other holdings (in order to keep its country shares in proper proportion), thereby depressing prices in other countries' stock markets. In the case of open-end funds, managers may be also forced to raise cash to meet redemptions whenever there is a price fall in one country.
We are particularly interested in the hypothesis that mutual fund managers or holders on
Wall Street respond to an adverse shock in one emerging market by selling securities in other emerging markets, and that this is the specific mechanism whereby the shock is transmitted. If markets were perfectly efficient and integrated, there would be no discernible difference in the reactions of prices of country funds in New York versus the corresponding equity prices in emerging markets themselves. Standard models of correlation based on fundamentals assume perfect efficiency and integration, as do standard models of contagion based on speculative bubbles or currency crises. But the country funds do not behave like this, as we shall see.
b) Country Fund Contagion
The country fund data set may be well-suited to get at a particular aspect of what we mean by contagion. It offers an opportunity to test whether the transmission of a negative shock from one emerging market to another "pass through" the community of New York mutual funds on the way. It also gives us the opportunity to study the effects on different regions as well as the effects on separate countries within each region. Contagion transmitted via New York may be the consequence of institutional practices, but it may also reflect herding behavior on the part of country fund managers or holders.
This paper uses weekly data from several Asian and Latin American country funds to investigate spillover effects from one market to others. Closed-end country funds have been established as vehicles to hold equities from different foreign markets. They provide a way to invest in remote countries without having to buy equities directly in the local markets. Each consists of a fixed number of shares, invested in stocks from a particular country. They are traded for a price in New York City. Their net asset value (NAV) is calculated by aggregating the values of the underlying assets at their individual prices in the domestic market and converting to U.S. dollars.
Closed-end country funds are known usually to trade at a discount, on average, 3 a phenomenon called the discount puzzle. Because the price and the NAV are ultimately the price of the same asset, one would expect them to be equal to each other, so that discounts would be zero.
However the shares cannot be redeemed, so holding shares of a country fund is not equivalent to holding the basket of constituent stocks. In Frankel and Schmukler (1996) , we show that there is little possibility of direct or pure arbitrage. Nevertheless, one would still expect investors to react to large discounts (or premiums) by doing some kind of impure arbitrage, which works to correct gradually over time unusually large gaps between the fund price and NAV. In Frankel and Schmukler (1996a) we propose that discounts may reflect expectations of international investors that differ from those of domestic investors. It is assumed that country funds are mostly held by foreign investors, while domestic investors mostly buy securities directly in the local stock markets. If foreign investors know that they are further away from information, they are willing to pay on average a lower value for the same asset. This is an instance of asymmetric information studied in Schmukler (1996) . Frankel and Schmukler (1996a) extend that argument by hypothesizing that movement in the discount reflects movement in the relative expectations of foreign investors. We test whether there is evidence of asymmetric information. We do find that before the Mexican crisis, local investors reacted as the front-runners of the crisis, as if they had a different information set. The evidence suggests that, while local investors lost confidence beforehand, the confidence of the international community collapsed only after the devaluation, and to a lesser degree.
We also find cointegrating relationships between fund prices and NAVs. Schmukler (1996) finds that although most fund prices and NAVs are non-stationary, they tend to be linked by a linear relationship in the long run. The cointegrating vectors are in general (1, -1), as theory suggests. A change in the NAV is fully transmitted to its country fund price in the long run, even though in the short run the transmission is only partial, since the adjustment coefficients are relatively small.
If a change in a NAV were transmitted to its price instantaneously, we would not be able to test for Granger-causality between a local market and the corresponding country fund in New York.
We would only be able to test for Granger-causality among country funds. It would be impossible to distinguish between a country fund's NAV and price at all, since they would move together. In fact, however, a change in a NAV takes time to be fully transmitted to its price. This means that it can have a more immediate effect on equity prices in other countries, as measured by their NAVs, than on its own fund price. In consequence, country funds enable us to test the channel through which contagion takes place: whether a shock in Mexican NAVs is directly transmitted to other countries by affecting the other country fund NAVs, prices, or both.
Correlation Across Countries: Descriptive Statistics a) Was There Contagion?
We begin by looking at how country funds behaved around the Mexican crisis. Mexico. The Canadian dollar also hit a nine-year low. In Europe, the Italian lira, the British pound, and the Spanish peseta declined against the stronger German mark.
Several factors may explain the delay in contagion displayed in Table 8 .1. The peso devaluation of December 20 was initially perceived as a Mexican balance-of-payments problem. It was after December that the fragile banking situation became evident. 4 In addition, the Mexican political situation turned more delicate by the end of February, when Raul Salinas, brother of the former president Carlos Salinas, was arrested in connection with Ruiz-Massieu assassination. The political conflict between Carlos Salinas and President Zedillo intensified by early March. Lastly, the announcement of an economic plan was postponed several times, which was interpreted as political inability to deal with the crisis. According to some views, Mexico's government did not present a sound macroeconomic plan until mid March. Then, Mexican financial markets started to recover.
b) Are Co-movements Higher Within Regional Markets than Across Them?
As a more systematic approach to the empirical analysis, we look at whether the shock in Mexico may have affected Latin American markets more strongly than Asian markets throughout the recent four-year period. We find that there is some degree of intra-regional co-movement. However it is evident that investors did not treat each country fund equally. This section analyses the extent of comovement.
Appendix 1 reports three correlation tables. out of 42 country pairs the NAV correlation is higher than the fund price correlation, in terms of changes.) These relationships hold especially for Mexican country funds. Second, the crosscorrelation among fund prices are larger than the cross-correlations among Asian and Latin American NAVs. (For 83 out of 105 country pairs the country fund price cross-correlation is higher than the NAV correlation.) In the case of Asia, it is more difficult to suggest an overall conclusion.
The correlation matrices support the idea that the Mexican crisis may have impacted Latin America more directly, and to a higher extent, than Asia. It also suggests that the shock to Asia may have been transmitted via changes in country fund prices. More generally, the correlation matrices suggest that fund prices and NAVs tend to be more connected to the market where they are traded than to the country where the underlying assets are located.
If markets were perfectly integrated, country fund NAVs and prices would move in the same way. But the fact that there is segmentation allows us to study the reaction of different kinds of investors to shocks. If cross-country correlation were as high for NAVs as they are for fund prices, then one would most naturally attribute the correlations to common fundamentals. However, fund prices between Asia and Latin America are more highly correlated than NAVs. This suggests the possibility of over reaction on the part of New York investors. Joint changes in fund prices may reflect changes in U.S. investors' sentiments with respect to emerging markets, not related to fundamentals.
Granger-causality Tests a) Do the Granger-causality Results Support the Previous Finding?
As a second approach to studying the degree of regional co-movement, we estimate all the possible combinations of Granger-causality tests. In other words, we look at how past changes in country fund NAVs, prices, and discounts affect present changes of country fund NAVs and prices. We separately test whether each country fund Granger-causes each of the other country funds, with respect to both price and NAV. We work with the error-correction model specification, due to our previous finding of cointegration between country funds prices and NAVs. The models estimated are:
We estimate each equation separately to see the effect of each country fund (NAV, price and discount) on other NAVs and prices. Country fund a is the endogenous variable while country fund b is the exogenous variable in the model. We control for changes in the U.S. interest rate, since Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) and others find it to be the principal external factor explaining the capital inflow episode. We also control for changes in the biggest Mexican fund (MXF). 6 Furthermore, due to the presence of cointegration we include discounts, which stand for restricted cointegrating vectors. This restriction on price and NAV appears plausible since we have already tested for a cointegrating vector, and found it to be (1,-1).
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All the results are summarized in Tables 8.2 We should remark that although the data in some cases go from 1985 to 1996, most country funds only started trading in the 1990s. 9 Therefore these results may reflect largely the big shock of the 1994 Mexican crisis. This may explain why there seems to be Granger-causality from Latin
America to Asia and not otherwise. Some years from now we will be able to test whether the relationships revealed here continue to hold.
b) Did Contagion "Pass Through" New York?
In this section we test whether there is contagion specifically from Mexico, and, if so, whether the transmission passes through New York. In order to do that, we put together part of the results from the previous Granger-causality estimations in Tables 8.4 and 8.5. We look at how changes in the biggest Mexican fund Granger-causes prices and NAVs of other Asian and Latin American funds.
We only report the cases of the Mexico Fund (MXF) as an exogenous variable, since that fund seems to be the driving force among Mexican funds. The other two Mexican funds, which are appreciable smaller in size, were found to be Granger-caused by changes in MXF.
The separate estimation of both equations allows us to look at the channel through which contagion takes place. A shock in a Mexican NAV may affect both the other country fund price directly, as well as the other NAV. It may also affect the other NAV, and through it the other country fund price. Conversely, the channel may go through fund prices to NAVs.
We know that there is cointegration between each country fund NAV and price. Therefore, a permanent shock to NAVs (prices) will prompt prices (NAVs) to adjust gradually to the long-run relationship. The model specification allows us to estimate whether the long-run effect goes through the price-NAV cointegration, or whether both country fund price and NAV are affected directly from changes in the Mexico Fund. In other words, by controlling for past changes in the endogenous country fund NAV and price, we can test whether exogenous past changes in MXF are statistically significant in explaining both current changes in country fund NAVs and prices, either one of them, or neither of them.
Results from Tables 8.4 This kind of direct contagion to Latin America and indirect spillover to Asia suggests that crises such as December 1994 are somehow regional, at least in the short run. This was also supported by the correlation matrices and by Tables 8.2 and 8 .3, which show how country fund
NAVs and prices co-move. Latin American funds appear more connected with the Mexican funds than are those of Asia. This is consistent with the argument of Calvo and Reinhart (1995) that the crisis was more regional than global. Nevertheless, there is transmission to Asia.
Why are Some Countries Affected Differently from Others? a) Different Patterns in Different Countries?
Even though we have already found that fund NAVs and prices are correlated with other fund NAVs and prices, depending on the market in which they trade, this section asks whether individual countries react in particular ways. A first glance at Although the entire region is affected by a shock like the Mexican crisis, each country is not hit in the same way. The country thought to have strong economic fundamentals, Chile, is much less influenced than those that are considered to be in economic situations similar to Mexico's, like
Argentina. This conclusion is consistent with other findings. Burki and Edwards (1995) point out that Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela were the countries that suffered the most severe consequences after the Mexican crisis, while Chile and Colombia showed a stronger position. The IMF (1995) section on spillover effects points out that the Argentine and Brazilian stock markets were the most affected by the 1994 devaluation.
In Asia, the First Philippine Fund price decreased 28%, almost the same as Argentine's fall.
Other countries present mixed evidence, depending on the country fund we look at. The sharpest declines were experienced in Indonesia, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Tables 8.4 and 8.5 also help to understand how the Mexico Fund is related to other country funds. As pointed out in the previous section, Table 8 .4 says that most Asian country funds are hit through changes in New York, rather than in Mexico City. The only countries that turn out not to be directly explained by the Mexico Fund are big countries like China and India, as well as Taiwan.
Note that these tests reflect the relationship throughout the sample, while the crisis refers only to one specific point in time.
The falls reported in Table 8 .1 might also be due to external sources unrelated to Mexico.
Nevertheless, there is some correspondence. The ones that are hit both directly and indirectly are Philippines and Vietnam. These are among the funds that experienced the greatest decline after December 1994. The Philippines has often in the literature been described as more closely related to Latin America than to Asia. Table 8 .5 shows that the NAV of Argentina, the country most associated with Mexico, is hit directly. Argentina Fund price is affected through changes in the Argentine NAV-price relationship.
This can be interpreted as Argentine NAVs being very sensitive and reacting very fast to changes in Mexican NAVs. The Mexico Fund is not statistically significant in explaining Argentina Fund price since this effect is entirely captured by Argentine NAV (which is included in the regression).
b) Is Contagion Related to Fundamentals?
We have seen that countries appear to be affected in different ways. We now ask why. We take 1994 economic fundamentals as exogenous, and relate them to the different contagion measures that we have developed: the fall in fund prices from December 2 to March 10, and the results from the Granger-causality tests. We do not perform serious econometric analysis since we only have 29 country funds. We would need more country funds to carry out a more comprehensive analysis.
Furthermore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine why spillover effects from the Mexican crisis was so widespread. Notwithstanding, we are able to get a first impression on why spillovers happened in the way described above. were the ones that suffered higher negative spillover effects. Specifically, the countries with the most sensitive equity funds tend to be those with the highest debt/export ratios: in Asia they are Vietnam, Pakistan, India, the Philippines and Indonesia. The least sensitive tend to have the lowest debt/export ratios: Taiwan, Malaysia and Korea.
Price falls of country funds also appear to be negatively related to two other ratios:
exports/GNP and reserves/GNP. The former relationship says that more open countries appear to suffer less contagion. This can be interpreted as investors viewing open economies as more reliable, because the cost of a policy reversal or default is higher. Reinforcing this interpretation is that the debt/export ratio is found significant in explaining the country fund price fall, while the debt/GNP ratio was not. Sachs (1995) made a very similar point. Given the size of their external debts, he argues that Latin American countries were hit more strongly mainly because of their weak export sectors.
In addition, we take the percentage of cases that each NAV is explained by other country funds in the sample-wide causality tests, and relate it to the debt/export ratio. We find that countries with higher proportional debt stocks tend to be more sensitive, in that their equity prices are explained by shocks in other countries. Finally, we find that countries with large GNPs are more likely to have spillover effects over other countries than are small economies. The bigger the country, the more changes in its country fund NAVs or prices explain other fund prices. This finding is consistent with S. Calvo and Reinhart (1995) , who find one-way causality from large to small countries. They show that the capital account balance of small countries are affected by changes in larger countries in the region, but not conversely.
We have also studied the dynamics of contagion. We generated impulse-response functions and calculated variance decompositions. We analyzed how shocks in the Mexico Fund NAV and price are transmitted to other country fund prices. It looks like shocks in Mexico have more permanent and bigger effects in Latin America than in Asia. In the latter case, some country funds exhibit price overshooting soon after the shock. The long-run effect is less important for Asian than for Latin American country funds. The variance decomposition results are very sensitive to the equations ordering. We do not report the results in order to save space, and because of their lack of robustness. The equations seem to have important common effects, which change the results when they are assigned to the first variable of the model. We first showed that both Asian and Latin American country fund prices suffered a significant drop after the Mexican crisis. We then illustrated that Latin American NAVs show high co-movement among themselves, compared to the price correlations. We also found similar results for country fund prices across regions (traded in New York), compared to NAVs across regions (traded in the local markets). So fund prices and NAVs seem to be not only related to the underlying assets, but also to the markets where they trade. The overall evidence for Asia is less conclusive. We estimated all possible combinations of three variable country fund models in the error-correction form. These models allowed us to test for Granger-causality in the cointegrating framework. The results from these estimations are consistent with the correlation matrices.
We used bivariate error-correction models to test whether the biggest Mexican fund helps to predict changes in other fund NAVs and prices. We showed, using the Mexico Fund, that Mexican shocks may have been transmitted directly to Latin American NAVs. At the same time, the effect appears to pass through New York to Asia. Changes in the Mexico Fund affect Asian country fund prices, but not NAVs once we control for lagged changes in NAVs and prices.
Finally, we studied whether the contagion is purely regional. We found that different countries were affected differently. The Philippines, usually claimed to be similar to Latin America, was hit directly from Mexico. Argentina, the Latin American country thought to have similar economic fundamentals to Mexico, was also hit directly. Furthermore, when we relate the extent of the crisis with some measures of fundamentals we find interesting results. Price falls in country funds after December 1994 are positively related to weak fundamental measures, while they are negatively related to strong fundamental ones. Similarly, those NAVs that are seen to be especially sensitive throughout the sample tend to have large debt-exports ratios. This is consistent with the general finding of stronger vulnerability to contagion in Latin America than in Asia, as well as deviations of Chile and the Philippines (respectively) from the general finding. In addition, contagion appears to be more powerful when coming from large countries than small ones.
In this paper, we tested whether there is evidence of contagion. However, we did not test if that contagion is due to herding behavior or fundamentals contagion, which would be a difficult task to address. Investors may have sold other country funds because of generalized fears with respect to Latin America, or because they perceive the countries in the region as having similar fundamentals.
Nevertheless, our finding that contagion often passes through the New York investor community suggests that institutional details play a role, contrary to the pure models of fully-integrated efficient markets. At the same time, our finding that such variables as debt/export ratios help determine vulnerability suggests that economic fundamentals also play a role, contrary to the pure models of speculation and contagion as herd behavior.
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